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Presence of Mind: Consciousness 
and the Sense of Self 
Christian Coseru 
The rejection of a permanent self as the 'thinker of thoughts ' 
and the 'senser of sensations' poses a significant challenge for 
Buddhist philosophy of mind: if there is no permanent agent 
(kartii), and if actions (karman) are merely transient events within 
a continuum of causally interconnected states, how is the 
phenomenal character of conscious experience and the sense of 
ownership implicit in first-person agency to be explained? At 
the same time, the rejection of a permanent locus for experience 
offers an opportunity to explore the problem of personal identity 
on phenomenological rather than metaphysical grounds: 
answering the question of why self-awareness comes bound 
up with a sense of self (whether owned or merely occurrent) 
can thus be pursued independently of metaphysical concerns 
about what a self is and what are its fundamental attributes. It 
also allows for an analysis of the structure of awareness without 
assuming that such a structure reflects an external relation of 
ownership between consciousness and the self. 
Let us note from the outset that there are substantive 
disagreements among Buddhist philosophers about how the 
problem of personal identity should be framed, the kind of 
evidence that is deemed reliable, and the lines of justification 
that are worth pursuing: it can be (and has been) framed in 
both epistemological and ontological terms, drawing on both 
experiential accounts and metaphysical considerations about 
what there is, and taking the form of both conceptual analysis 
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and ostensive demonstration. Nonetheless, there is a general 
consensus that at the most basic level the no-self view is entailed 
by a reductive analysis of experience. The claim is that 
phenomenal consciousness is actually a synthesis of five 
different kinds of activities: bodily, affective, perceptual, 
dispositional, and self-reflexive. 1 This view of personal 
identity informs all debates in Indian and Buddhist 
philosophy of mind and is indispensable to any account of 
cognition. By replacing the cognizing 'self' or 'I' with a causal 
chain the outcome of which is momentary cognitive events, 
Buddhist philosophers treat the cognizing subject as an 
emergent aspect of the embodied and dynamic functioning of 
these aggregates. In short, talk of 'self' or 'I' as the agent of 
experience is just a mistaken, folk-psychological way of 
using the first person pronoun referentially (that is, as 
referring to subjects of experience). 
But if this Buddhist account of personal identity is built, as 
it is claimed, on phenomenological (thus descriptive) rather than 
metaphysical grounds, the obvious question arises: is there 
such a place or locus for experience? And if there is, does it 
have the sort of character that is amenable to 
phenomenological analysis? A positive answer would 
suggest that experience is such that at a minimum, the 
'sense of self' must be an ineliminable structural feature of 
cognitive awareness. In what follows I want to pursue the 
question of precisely what conception of self-
consciousness can be supported on experiential grounds, 
and whether such conception is sufficient to account for the 
ineliminable features of phenomenal consciousness. 
I. Defining Consciousness
It is generally agreed that consciousness is a somewhat slippery 
term. However, more narrowly defined as 'phenomenal 
consciousness' it captures at least three essential features or 
aspects: subjective experience (the notion that what we are 
primarily conscious of are experiences), subjective knowledge (that 
feature of our awareness that gives consciousness its distinctive 
reflexive character), and phenomenal contrast (the phenomenality 
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of awareness, absence of which makes consciousness intractable) 
(cf. Siewert 1998). I will only discuss here the subjective and 
epistemic aspects of phenomenal consciousness, specifically 
what I take to be two of its constitutive features: presence and 
reflexivity. 
Phenomenal  consciousness is what makes present, 
disclosing at once a world and a minimal sense of self. It is also 
constitutive of the character of experience. That there is 
something it is like to be conscious means that experience is 
what it is by virtue of being present to itself: the smell of 
roses is all that is needed for an experience to be disclosed as 
an instance of olfactory self-awareness. As such 
consciousness marks a specific cognitive event as being for 
someone or as having what phenomenologists call 'for-me-
ness' (Kriegel and Zahavi 2015). There is no such thing as a 
generic experience, as if from nowhere and for no one. We do 
not experience the world and ourselves as though we were a 
witness in a Cartesian theatre or a voyeur peeping from 
behind the scene. Rather, awareness makes manifest, enacts, 
and transforms the world and ourselves as we move through 
it. We look on in utter amazement at a world that glances 
back and makes us blush, for the world in question is the 
world as perceived. 
To open up to a world is not to be thrust, as a bystander 
might, onto a stage and asked to play some unfamiliar part. 
Rather, it is like taking your turn as the play moves along and 
the plot unravels. As embodied and minded creatures 'we' 
are always in character, though, of course, not always in the 
same character. Consciousness does not begin in reflection, 
when we pause to remember a line or to ponder an idea. 
Rather, as a reflection it always finds itself, as the conventions 
of epic poetry tell us, in medias res, in the middle of things. 
Awareness, and empirical or perceptual awareness in 
particular, has an intentional character: we always find 
ourselves in a world, or as Heidegger puts it, in one mood or 
another, and never simply there, as bare existence. 
Phenomenal consciousness is important if we are to 
understand the world we live in and our place in it. Some argue 
that the phenomenal character of experience is such that our 
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most basic beliefs, call them perceptual beliefs, are not only 
immediately justified (Pryor 2000, 2004) but in effect are nothing 
but judgments about experience (Dennett 2005); others that 
experience has a seeming character, that there is a way things 
seem to us that is different from our judgments about them 
(Carman, 2005, 2007; Huemer 2005, 2007). Furthermore, some 
claim that we cannot have first-personal knowledge of our own 
mental states without phenomenal experience (Pitt 2004); others 
that perceptual experience must be conscious in a phenomenal 
sense in order for us to have access to demonstrative thoughts 
(Smithes 2011); and still others that phenomenal experience is 
what makes our beliefs, perceptual or otherwise, reliable 
(Chalmers, 2003). Lastly, some argue that the phenomenal 
character of experience and its phenomenal content are in effect 
inseparable (Chalmers 2004, Coseru 2012). 
Indian and Buddhist philosophers likewise are split on this 
issue: some, such as the Vaibhashika and the Sautrantikas offer 
reductionist accounts of experience, others (Vedanta and 
Sankhya philosophers) argue that an experience should count 
as such insofar as it is attributable to a self that owns it, and 
still others (chiefly the Naiyaykas) that such a self might not 
admit of qualitative experiences or possess anything like 
determined awareness. At least in the Indian philosophical 
context, the main disagreement about phenomenal 
consciousness is between those who take consciousness to be 
simple and unanalysable, and those who understand 
consciousness as a property of certain mental states (typically, 
states of so-called metacognition or metacognitive awareness).2 
Despite significant contributions in this area, we still lack 
reliable methods for charting the phenomenology of 
conscious experience. In recent years, a new proposal about 
the character of phenomenal consciousness has emerged 
that challenges the received, orthodox view that 
perceptual phenomenology is the only phenomenology there 
is. Proponents of this new view argue that conscious thought 
too possesses a kind of distinct or proprietary 
phenomenology. Introduced under the rubric of cognitive 
phenomenology, this proposal is meant to extend, 
supplement, and even supplant the range and scope of the 
phenomenal character of experience (Bayne and Montague 
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2011). Cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenology of 
thought extends the role of phenomenal consciousness 
beyond the domain of the present at hand to include all 
mentality. In other words, proponents of cognitive 
phenomenology do not simply state that thought has 
phenomenal character in virtue of being associated with 
some sensory or affective state.3 Rather they claim that 
thought, much like sensation, has its own proprietary 
phenomenology or 'what it is like.' My thought "Paris is the 
capital of France" does not derive its character from 
association with co-occurrent sensory, affective, or imagistic 
experiences. That is, there is something it is like to entertain 
that thought that is not reducible to how I feel about Paris, 
political geography or the French people. 
However, while cognitive phenomenology may help extend 
the boundaries of conscious experience beyond the sensory and 
affective domains, it does little to augment our still rather 
rudimentary methodological toolset. Instead of using the 
language of qualia to capture the character of what it is like to 
have a certain kind of experience, it uses the language of 
introspection and self-knowledge to ground the content of 
thought in an experience of the thought's own determinacy. 
I am sympathetic to the project of cognitive phenomenology, 
but, just as with the phenomenology of sense perception, I find 
it problematic that we are trying to justify the epistemic 
relevance of phenomenal consciousness rather than explore its 
structural features. If consciousness is what makes present then 
arguably it is constitutive of experience. Coming to terms with 
phenomenal consciousness, then, means resisting the many 
ways in which it can be substituted for more concrete 
phenomena like the so-called datum of experience or to 
judgments about it. 
II. Presence and Reflexivity
Let us begin then with experience. Imagine you are travelling 
to a distant place, perhaps to attend a conference, and upon 
arrival you step out of the airport only to find yourself immersed 
in a strange and unfamiliar world. You look around for clues 
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about how to proceed: directions to a taxi stand, an airport 
shuttle or the information desk. Before long, and with some 
luck, you are on your way to your hotel. As airport ramps 
give way to freeways and freeways to avenues and narrow 
streets a whole new urban fabric unravels before your eyes. 
Everywhere, a seething mass of people is going about their 
daily affairs. You are drawn in, you attend to every gesture 
and detail of this vast quivering tapestry. As the scene moves 
along, you find yourself adjusting your gaze to get a better 
grip. Perhaps you are riding in a shuttle or sharing a taxi with 
a colleague. Your colleague has been here before, and she 
knows the place very well. She is a gifted and gregarious 
storyteller, and on your way into the city you get your first 
guided tour, punctuated with anecdotes and solicitous advice. 
You are intrigued, fascinated, but also slightly apprehensive. 
You wonder what lies ahead for you. As you zoom past 
imposing landmarks and through crowded thoroughfares, 
reaching deeper into the heart of the city, it slowly begins to 
sink in. Like Mary the colour scientist who, upon being 
released from her black and white room, has her first 
experience of colour, you are experiencing a world you l
have ony indirectly known about. 1his is the world made present. 
What kind of presence is this? On reflection, one might say that 
it is a subjective one, a transformation of self-awareness by 
immersion into an unfamiliar environment. But this horizon of 
experience where you now find yourself has not come about 
solely as a result of what the new surroundings afford. 
What do scenarios like the one just described tell us about 
the phenomenal character of consciousness? Herein lies the 
problem: unlike the typical thought experiment, there is no 
setup; no argument about what could conceivably be the case. 
Inferential relations, though part of the structure of awareness, 
are not constitutive of it. Small infants are aware, and so are 
many animals, despite lacking the complex conceptual schema 
of metacognitive awareness. To proponents of belief based 
theories of perception this scenario mig
h
t seem contrived, even 
impossible, given assumptions about what empirical awareness 
can and does deliver. But it should not be. And here is why. 
In perceiving we do not simply register objects within our 
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field of experience. Neither do we stand over against these 
objects in a type of representational relation. Rather, the 
perceiving act itself makes present its object, say a red apple, 
as an event that has duration and takes place within a 
horizon of experience that is pre-reflectively given. On this 
account of perception, suited to capture its enactive and 
sensorimotor contingencies, presence, that is, the sense we 
have of enduring objects, states, and events, and reflexivity, 
the notion that our cognitive awareness has a for-me-ness 
structure, are intrinsic features of experience rather than 
concepts that frame our thinking about the character of 
experience. 
Critics of sensorimotor accounts of perception (e.g. Clark 
2006) claim that perception cannot apprehend past and/ or 
future events, and thus that presence and temporality are not 
within the purview of perception. Proponents of the view that 
perception has a horizon structure and is reflexively 
constituted (Kelly 2008, Noe 2012) argue that what I perceive 
seems to include not only those elements that are 
immediately present to awareness but also those that are only 
intuitively available. The sensorimotor account of perception, 
thus, advances the phenomenally plausible view that in 
perception we apprehend whole objects (and events), not 
merely their perceptible parts, and apprehend them actively 
as occasioning different types of experience (the red apple 
affords such experiences as seeing red, picking or tossing). 
While many agree that this debate about the nature of 
perception cannot be settled on phenomenologically neutral 
grounds, few doubt that framing it as an account of the 
structure of phenomenal consciousness can extend it in a 
profitable direction. Such a framing, not surprisingly, is also 
at work in Buddhist Abhidharma accounts: Vasubandhu, 
for instance, understands presence (smiti) as the capacity to 
"not allow to be carried off" (iilambana-asampramoca): that is, 
the capacity to retain the present moment.4 My claim is that a 
solution to the problem of how best to account for the 
elements of existence and/ or experience (dharmas), much like 
contemporary attempts to frame perceptual awareness in 
terms of its enactive and sensorimotor contingencies, cannot 
satisfactorily be offered without coming to terms with the
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reflexivity of phenomenal consciousness. 
Let us briefly consider the Buddhist analysis of experience. 
First, the Buddhist rejects the notion of a permanent self as the 
agent of sensory activity. But this rejection, of course, poses a 
significant challenge. Indeed, as we noted above, if there is no 
agent, and if actions are merely transient events arising within 
na contiuum of causally interconnected states, we are confronted 
with an explanatory gap: how is the efficacy of causal or, in 
Buddhist terms, karmic processes to be explained? That is, why 
is it that some causal chains give rise to the emergent 
phenomenon of conscious awareness and its implicit sense of 
self and others do not? It is not surprising therefore that early 
interpreters of the no-self doctrine in the West (much like 
Brahmanical critics of the Buddhist no-self view in India) have 
argued that the denial of self in Buddhism should be understood 
as targeting common views such as those that associate the self 
with the psychophysical aggregates, and not the metaphysical 
notion of self (Bhattacharya 1973: 64). 
Can Abhidharma reductionism, with its account of primitive 
atom-like 'qualitons' of experience, and its various accounts of 
consciousness in terms of life continuum (citta-santana) and 
repository consciousness (alaya-vijiiana)) provide an adequate 
conceptual basis for advancing the thesis that mental states have 
a self-presentational character? That is, does the phenomenal 
mineness implicit, for instance, in Asanga and Vasubandhu's 
notion that I-thoughts are occurrent features of afflicted minds 
(klicma-manas) count as a descriptive account of the structure of 
experience? Or is it just an instance of failure to secure epistemic 
access to what there is? Ganeri (2012: 156ff) has recently claimed 
that it does not count, and has built a strong case for regarding 
the first-person stance by means of which thoughts are 
individuated in the mental stream as an instance of 
constitutively owned rather than deluded I-thoughts. Later 
Buddhist solutions to this conundrum vary considerably, from 
the Pudgalavadin's proposal that first-personal agency non­
reductively supervenes on the aggregates to reflexivist accounts 
of consciousness as articulated mainly by Dignaga and 
Dharmakirti and their successors. It is the reflexivist's proposal 
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that interests us here for the promising way in which it 
accounts for the character of mental states in terms of 
features that form an integral part of their structure (such as, 
for instance, the principle of reflexivity which states that 
essentially consciousness consists in conscious mental 
states being implicitly self-aware). Proponents of Buddhist 
reflexivism claim that consciousness is best understood as a 
continuum of self­aware experiences that are dissociated both 
in terms of their phenomenal content and their phenomenal 
character (Dreyfus 2011: 123; Coseru 2012: ch 8). Additional 
proposals range from memory-based accounts (Thompson 
2011) to enactivist and performative accounts of self-
awareness (MacKenzie 2011) that argue for some minimal self 
as the pre-linguistic structure of lived experience. 
III. Mineness without the Self
It is more likely, however, that the early Buddhist tradition is 
characterized primarily by an attempt to break free both from 
the speculative notion of an ultimate, immutable and eternal 
self and, at the same time, from the notion of a concrete 
psychological or biographical self (Hulin 1978: 43). As I have 
argued elsewhere (Coseru 2009), the frequent use of 
indexicals such as 'I' (aha1fl) and 'mine' (mama) should not be 
taken as indicative of the view that the Buddha accepts the 
conventional reality of persons. Indeed, later Buddhist 
traditions develop specific notions, such as that of mind-
stream, life-continuum mind, and repository 
consciousness (citta-santiina, bhavanga-citta, and iilaya-vijftiina, 
respectively) precisely in order to avoid not only the 
trappings of metaphysical notions of the self but also the view 
that such notions might have a fixed referent.5 The denial of a 
permanent self, as well as the refusal to treat persons as 
referring to anything real and permanent, does not, however, 
extend to consciousness, whose temporal and horizon 
structures make possible reflective or introspective thought. 
The centrality of the no-self doctrine in Buddhist thought 
is explained on the basis of its pragmatic role in guiding the 
adept on the path to enlightenment. Furthermore, the no-self 
doctrine provides a justification for treating endurance, 
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independence, and self-subsistence as neither desirable nor 
attainable, but rather as what they are: mistaken notions 
resulting from the habitual tendency to construct a 
substantive identity from a stream of psychophysical 
phenomena. Now, how exactly a person without a self lives 
a good and meaningful life, and makes progress along the 
path to awakening is, of course, deliciously puzzling. 
This Buddhist claim that our sense of self is imputed and 
our attribution of inherent existence to it habitually acquired,6 
is not that different, of course, from Hume's claim that a self is 
never apprehended in the mental series.7 The Buddhist, much 
like Hume, is a bundle theorist, the first such theorist. The 
routine misapprehension of the discrete phenomena of 
experience as a self leads to a dualistic perspective: things appear 
and are categorized as either objective (thus external, but 
empirically accessible) or as subjective (thus internal, and 
immediately accessible to consciousness). Puzzled by this 
dualistic outlook, we cope by constructing a conception of the 
self as the permanent locus of experience. 
What we are left with, then, is the picture of a constantly 
changing world of sensory phenomena in which there are no 
independent entities, only textures or clusters of sensory 
impressions that constitute the content of conscious awareness. 
In this fluctuating world of minimally sensory awareness 
entities exist only as aggregated phenomena of experience. 
But this phenomenality is not simply the experiential 
counterpart of corresponding physical objects and functions, 
for what lies outside the sphere of perception is always 
already constituted by the dynamic structures of our cognitive 
architecture.8 The world as perceived is brought into existence 
through the activity of the senses and goes out of existence 
with the cessation of sensory activity. This phenomenal 
realm is not an objective world that exists over and 
above its intersubjective apprehension, for such a world, 
devoid of any reference to subjects of experience, is not 
within the purview of empirical awareness. 
Now, Buddhist Abhidharma philosophers do not deny the 
reality of the constitutive elements of existence and/ or 
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experience (dharmas). Rather, the suggestion is simply that we 
cannot properly discern between the phenomenal character and 
content of experience if consciousness is not taken to have a 
specific kind of structure. That structure or schema is most 
apparent in the dual nature of empirical awareness: indeed, the 
body, as an instrument (kara1J.a) of perceptual activity, is both 
the medium of contact with the world and the world with which 
it comes in contact. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2012: ch. 3), such a view 
finds an interesting parallel in Husserl's account of the 
paradoxical nature of the body as revealed through 
phenomenological reduction. For Husserl, phenomenological 
reduction (epoche)-essentially a method of bracketing 
ontological assumptions about the natural world in order to 
examine the intentional structures of consciousness-reveals 
the two-fold appearance of the body, first as a biological entity 
(Korper) connected to the continuum of life, and second as a 
medium for the expression of life (Leib). The body is thus the 
locus of lived experience and, as such, has the capacity for both 
exploration and receptivity. This intuition about the dual nature 
of embodied awareness (as locus of lived experience) discloses 
a world of lived experience whose boundaries are not fixed but 
constantly shifting in relation to the desires, actions, and 
attitudes of an agent (Husserl 1970: Part III: A). The world or, 
better still, the environment that I inhabit is not just a structured 
domain of causally nested objects and relations but also a 
meaningful world of experience. 
The question that both Buddhist philosophers and 
contemporary philosophers interested in phenomenal 
consciousness must address is whether intentional experiences-
of the sort that disclose a world as pre-reflectively but 
meaningfully given-presuppose that consciousness itself, as the 
disclosing medium, is a knowable object. My claim is that we 
cannot answer this question in the affirmative: consciousness is not 
diachronically (or inferentially) known by a subsequent instance of 
cognitive awareness but rather is inherently self-aware, even if 
only minimally so. Though we may intend a previous moment of 
conscious awareness in introspection, this retrospective 
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apprehension of consciousness as an object cannot be its 
essential feature. 
Presence and reflexivity capture at the most basic level what 
it is like to be in a world whose boundaries are not fixed but 
constantly changing as the stream of consciousness follows its 
course. As one of the earliest proponents of what has come to 
be known as the active perception theory, Merleau-Ponty writes, 
"I cannot understand the function of living body,-except by 
enacting it myself" for "my body appears to me as an attitude 
with a view to a certain actual or possible task" (Merleau-Ponty 
2002: 87, 114). What is the best or most effective way of merging 
this phenomenological account of temporality and disclosure 
with the subject of experience, the elusive domain where 
experience presumably takes place? 
In a recent take on the debate over whether presence is basic 
and effortless, a kind of readiness-to-hand, or, on the contrary, 
something that has to be achieved, making explicit what was 
hitherto unthought and thus absent, Alva Noe (2012: 10) writes : 
" ... presence does not come for free. We achieve presence. We 
act it out... [T]his does not mean that our attitude is that of a 
stranger in a strange land, and that we must always strive to 
bring the world into focus." Noe faults existential 
phenomenologists like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Hubert 
Dreyfus for presenting us with a distorted picture of presence . 
According to one version of this picture, presence stands for 
deliberate and effortful engagement with the world, and thus 
for thoughtful as opposed to unthinking attunement. Against 
the prevailing legacies of intellectualism and empiricism, what 
is sought is not thematized thought but the unthematized, 
absorbed coping of the readiness-to-hand of the door knob, the 
remote control or any other piece of equipment. Noe thinks 
something has gone amiss here: the problem is not that absence 
better captures the implicit character of our habitual practices 
but rather that the ways of presence have not been properly 
explored. 
Now, if experience is a kind of presenting, the contents of 
which become available for interpretation and understanding 
only on a subsequent move, then Noe is not entirely right that 
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presence does not come for free. If, on the other hand, conscious 
experience is the product of a long and complex process of skill 
acquisition that opens up to a domain of objects, situations, and 
events (rather than, say, to a world simpliciter), then there is no 
pristine encounter and our attitude can never be that "of a 
stranger in a strange land." 
Recall the early account I gave of what it might be like to be 
a traveller to an unfamiliar destination. First of all, no 
destination, no matter how faraway and exotic, is upon arrival 
entirely unfamiliar. It cannot be, for the journey itself is an 
opening toward, and getting accustomed to, the unexpected. 
Journeying to a distant land is a lot like dwelling in anticipation 
for the arrival of an unknown guest: it alters the perception of 
one's surroundings and it invites circumspection. We are 
strangers in a strange land every time we let this body that is 
better informed, indeed, than we are about its dispositions and 
its surroundings fill us in about what is going on. One must 
choose one's examples carefully if one wants to get presence 
right. 
Noe uses the phenomenon of reading to make his case that 
presence is a kind of achie vement. We don 't pay attention to 
words and letters when we read. Rather, what makes reading 
possible is the possession of a complicated set of skills, including 
but not limited to, such as the capacity to recognize symbols, to 
interpret , remember and anticipate. Reading takes place in a 
language the cultural and communicational norms of which 
affect how and what one reads , and what for. And while the 
phenomenon of reading provides a good illustration of how 
Noe wants us to think of presence, it does little to advance the 
case that we can never be strangers in a strange land, and that 
experience can never disclose a wholly unfamiliar world . But 
travelling is not like reading, unless one takes travelling to be a 
slow progression through the book of life. At most it is like 
reading in a foreign language one is yet to master fully. There 
are always blocks and slippages, half-meanings and guesses. 
Even in one's native tongue reading is not like reading in this 
high achieving sort of way that Noe has in mind. Ask any poet. 
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IV. Conclusion: Co-constitutive Emergence
Can Buddhist reductionism about persons be reconciled with 
an analysis of the phenomenal character of consciousness? 
From a philosophical standpoint, the progressive move 
towards an analysis of consciousness in terms of its 
ineliminable phenomenological features championed by 
thinkers like Dignaga, Dharmakirti and their successors, can 
be conceivably claimed as an effort at effecting precisely such 
reconciliation. That we must and should identify those 
irreducible elements of experience (sensations, volitions, 
dispositions, patterns of habituation, etc) that any analysis of 
phenomenal consciousness can reveal does not mean, 
however, that there could be unintended consequences to 
this process of reductive analysis. Although we may debate 
whether or not the Buddhist phenomenological project is 
informed by certain metaphysical assumptions about the 
nature of reality, specifically the assumption that the 
entities that populate our world do not endure for any length 
of time, there is no denying that momentariness is taken not 
only as a principle of the nature of reality, but also (and more 
significantly) of cognitive awareness itself. The awareness that 
arises in conjunction with the activity of a given perception, 
thought or desire is itself impermanent and momentary: visual 
awareness and visual object, for instance, are both events 
within a mental stream of continuing relations. The question 
that Buddhist philosophers confront is precisely what accounts 
for the sense of presence that accompanies these cognitive 
series. In other words, if discrete, episodic cognitive events are 
all that constitutes the mental domain, how does appropriation 
and grasping, for instance, occur? I have in mind here 
specifically the basic mode of givenness of our experience. 
Some causal account is on offer. But the causal account, it 
seems, gives only an incomplete picture of the mental, for 
even as the Sanskrit term for cognitive awareness, vijniina, 
conveys the sense of differentiation and discernment, it is not 
exactly clear how such discernment also sorts between the pre-
reflective and reflective aspects of experience. Indeed, 
consciousness is not merely a faculty for discerning and 
sorting through the constitutive elements of experience, but 
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is itself an event in a series of interdependent causal and 
conditional factors. Thus, while the generic Buddhist 
viewpoint is that there is no such thing as a self as the agent 
of experience, for at least one group of Buddhists, 
generally associated with the logico­epistemological 
school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, an adequate account 
of phenomenal consciousness cannot dispense with a minimal 
sense of presence. 
These Buddhist epistemologists are concerned, much like 
Brentano, Husserl, and many contemporary philosophers 
working on phenomenal consciousness, not with how things, 
including mental states, are judged to be (without any 
reference to their mode of presentation) but with how things 
show up to us, with the phenomena of experience just as they 
appear to us before we set out to reflect and theorize about 
them. The picture they present roughly corresponds to what 
some have termed non-reductive "one-level theories of 
consciousness": that is, theories which propose that 
consciousness is essentially a matter of having or being an 
awareness of a world that does not require a prior 
(representational) awareness of our own mental states.9 
If experience is perspectivally given, it has both 
phenomenal salience and epistemological grounding. 
Reflexivism, thus, serves as a grounding principle, enabling 
the intentional and subjective aspects of experience to emerge 
co-constitutively and simultaneously. Can such a principle 
provide enough metaphysical support for I-thoughts of the 
sort "I am in pain," given the requirement of a criterion for 
individuating such thoughts in the mental stream? Do such 
self­ascriptions require independent criteria for 
individuating streams of subjectivity or can they occur 
solely on the basis of features that are intrinsic to each 
mental state? 
If reflexivity has a distinctive character, a specific 
givenness or for-me-ness, then mis-ascriptions are 
unintelligible if we assume that thought is transparent with 
regard to its occurrent for-me-ness. This first-personal 
givenness of experience is unmistaken. Indeed, mental states 
do not just arise in a mental stream: rather, they arise as 
having a distinctive intentional content and phenomenal 
character. Reflexivism then becomes a statement about the 
self-presentational character of 
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mental states: there are simply no such generic experiences of 
seeing or judging a particular state of affairs. Rather, there is 
experiential or reflexive awareness of occurrent perceptual or 
conceptual mental states. To postulate a basis for reflexivity 
outside the structure of experience is to mistakenly assume that 
experience is an emergent property of something that, while 
not itself experiential, has the functional organization to support 
such experiential self-ascriptions. 
We do strive to bring the world into focus and we do 
ourselves show up in an effortful way: by walking, turning, 
and adjusting our posture and gaze. But it is this implicit and 
non-reflective awareness that lets new elements effortlessly enter 
our horizon while others fade away. It may seem natural to 
think of experience in representational terms or in terms of 
relations of logical entailment. However, all too often such 
accounts of experience obscure the fact that the 
operations of representation and logical entailment are not 
primitive. Experience is not about representing facts or 
establishing logical and metaphysical truths, but about 
acquiring, perfecting, and transmitting practical knowledge 
and skills. 
NOTES 
1. These are the so-called five skandhas, known as the aggregates of
existence and/ or experience. For details, see Coseru (2012 ch. 3).
2. Extensive discussions of these classical debates are found in
Williams (1998), Garfield (2006), Dreyfus (2007), MacKenzie (2007),
Kellner (2010, 2011), Chadha (2011), Arnold (2010), Coseru (2012),
and Ganeri (2012).
3. This is a claim principally made by Prinz (2011).
4. For Vasubandhu' s discussion of smiti see the Abhidharmakosabhacya
II 24.5 (in Shastri 1970: 187). See also Jaini (2001) and Gethin (1998,
2011) for detailed discussions of the phenomenology of smiti.
5. Extensive critiques of the attempt to find support in the canonical
literature for the existence of a higher self, perhaps equated with
consciousness, are found in Warder (1970), Collins (1982),
Kalupahana (1987), Harvey (1995), and De Silva (2005).
Vasubandhu's Pudgala-praticedha-prakaratJa ("Treatise on the
Negation of the Person") provides one of most detailed Buddhist
critiques of the personalist view.
6. Cf. Sa:q,.yutta Nikaya IV, 102 (Feer 1975-2006); Majjhima Nikaya I,
130 (Chalmers 1994).
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7. The parallelism between the Buddhist and Humean reductive 
analyses of the self is explored at some length in Giles (1993), 
Tillemans (1996), and Kapstein (2001). 
8. It is this analysis of the content of experience that leads the 
abhidharmikas to the notion of 'cognitive aspects' (iikiira), which 
represent the particular mode of presentation of the contents of 
one's experience. For an account of the aspectual nature of 
cognition, specifically of perception, in the Abhidharma literature, 
see Dhammajoti (2007). 
9. See Thomasson (2008). One level-theories of consciousness oppose 
higher order thought theories, which postulate that conscious of 
phenomenal states are essentially those states of which we are 
immediately aware. 
REFERENCES 
Arnold, D. 2010. "Self-Awareness (Svasaf!1vitti) and Related Doctrines 
of Buddhists Following Dinnaga: Philosophical Characterizations 
of Some of the Main Issues." Journal of Indian Philosophy 38: 3. 
Bayne, T. and Montague, M . 2011. "Cognitive Phenomenology: An 
Introduction," in Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by T. Bayne and 
M. Montague. Oxford : Oxford University Press . 
Bhattacharya, K. 1973. L'iitman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien. 
Paris: icole FranAaise d 'Extrime Orient. 
Carman, T. 2005. "On the Inescapability of Phenomenology." In Smith , 
D.W . and Thomasson, AL. (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy 
of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University of Press, 67-89. 
-- . 2007. "Dennett on Seeming," Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 6: 99-106 . 
Chadha, Monima. 2011. "Self-awareness: Eliminating the Myth of the 
'Invisible Subject', " Philosophy East and West 61 (3): 453--467. 
Chalmers, David J. 2003. "The Content and Epistemology of 
Phenomenal Belief". In Consciousness : New Philosophical 
Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, Robert.1994. The Majjhima-Nikaya. Oxford: Pali Text Society. 
Clark, A. 2006. "That Lonesome Whistle: A Puz zle for the Sensorimotor 
Model of Perceptual Experience, " Analysis 66(1): 22-25. 
---. 2004. "The Representational Character of Experience ". In The 
Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter. 153-181. 
Collins, Steven. 1982. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada 
Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Coseru, C. 2009. "Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy," The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), edited by Edward 
Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 63 
N. Zalta. http:/ /plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian­
buddhism/.
___ C. 2012. Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and 
Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dennett, D. 2005. "What Do You Believe Is True Even Though You 
Cannot Yet Prove It?," Edge World Question Center, ed. by John 
Brockman. 
De Silva, Padmasiri. 2005. An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology. 4th 
ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dreyfus, Georges. 2011. "Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way 
Approach." In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, 
Self, No-Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and 
Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 114-156. 
Dhammajoti, K.L. 2007. "iikara and Direct Perception." Pacific World 
Journal 3 (9): 245-272. 
Feer, L. 1975-2006. Samyutta Nikaya. Pali Text Society, London: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ganeri, Jonardon. 2012. The Self Consciousness, Intentionality, and the 
First-Person Stance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- 2006. "The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's
at Stake in a Tibetan Debate?" Philosophy East and West 56 (2):
201-228.
Giles, J. 1993. "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism and Personal 
Identity." Philosophy East and West 43 (2): 175-200. 
Harvey, Peter. 1995. The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and 
NirviiJJ.a in Early Buddhism. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. 
Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macrnillian. 
Hulin, M. 1978. Le Principe de l'ego dans la pens.e indienne classique: La 
Notion d'aha,rikiira. Publication de l'Institut de Civilisation 
Indienne. Paris: Diffusion E. de Boccard. 
Husserl, E. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Jaini, Padmanabh S. 2001. "Smrti in the Abhidharma Literature and 
the Development of Buddhist Accounts of Memory of the Past." 
In In the Mirror of Memory, edited by Janet Gyatso, 47-60. Albany: 
SUNY. 
Kalupahana, D. 1987. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology. Albany, New 
York: State University of New York Press. 
Kapstein, Matthew. 2001. Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in 
Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought. Somerville, Mass.: Wisdom. 
64 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other 
Kellner, Birgit. 2010. "Self-Awareness (Svasanvedana) in Dinnaga' 
Pramar;samuccaya nd -v{tti: A Close Reading ." Journal of Indian 
Philosophy 38: 203-231. 
___ .2011. "Self-awareness (SvasaCvedana) and Infinite Regresses: 
A Comparison of Arguments by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti." 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4 5): 411-426. 
Kelly, S.D. 2008. "Content and Constancy: Phenomenology, 
Psychology, and the Content of Perception." Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 76 (3): 682-690. 
MacKenzie , M. 2011. "Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist 
Approaches to the Emergence of the Self." In Mark Siderits, Evan 
Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, Self, No-Self ? Perspectives from 
Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 239-273 . 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception, (tr.) C. Smith. 
London: Routledge. 
Noe, A. 2012. Varieties of Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Pitt, David. 2004. "The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It 
Like to Think That P?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
69: 1-36. 
Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist". Nous, 34:4, 517-
549. 
--. 2004. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?" Philosophical 
Issues 14: 349-378. 
Siewert, C. 1998. The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Smithies , Declan, 2011. "What is the Role of Consciousness in 
Demonstrative Thought?" The Journal of Philosophy, 108.1: 5-34, 
2011. 
Thomasson, Amie. L. 2008. "Phenomenal Consciousness and the 
Phenomenal World." The Monist, 91 (2): 191-214. 
Tillemans, T. 1996. "What Would It Be Like to be Selfless? Hinayanist 
Versions, Mahayanist Versions and Derek Parfit." 'itudes Asiatiques 
I Asiatische Studien 50 (4): 835-852 . 
Williams, P. 1998. The Refl exive Nature of Awareness. London: Curzon 
Pres s. 
Zahavi, Dan and Uriah Kriegel. 2015. Philosophy of Mind and 
Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, edited by D.O. 
Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou and W. Hopp. London: Routledge, 
forthcoming. 
